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I , Introduction 
Empirical tests of the human capital hypothesis—that 
education increases an individual's income—have been applied 
to several countries with favourable results • These 
results show that : (1) income differentials between individ-
uals of different educational levels are wide; (2) the dif„ 
ferentials establish shortly after the initial years of v/ork and 
maintain through the duration of the life cycle; (3) the differ-
entials are greater in developing countries than in developed 
countries; (k) after allowing for educational costs the returns 
to education exceed the returns .to physical capital investment 
in developing countries; (5) the highest returns are to primary 
education; and (6) private returns exceed social returns„ Which, 
if not all, of these results are true for Pakistan is not known. 
x
his paper yields such comparative results through an application 
of the human capital hypothesis to Rawalpindi City, The data for 
f 
Rawalpindi is for males and derives from a socio-economic survey 
conducted by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics in 1975* 
* 
The author is a Research Economist at the Pakistan Institute 
of Development Economics. Computations were performed by Abdul Wasay. 
Regressions were performed by Aqeel Ahmed. The author is grateful 
to Stephen E„ Guisinger and Dennis N. De Tray for several specific 
suggestions.and frequent discussion= 
For the impatient reader, the unqualified results 
of the paper are as follows, The application of the human 
capital hypothesis to Rawalpindi City is favourable. For 
all surveyed males at all completed educational levels, 
income differe ltials emerge with the initial year of work and 
maintain over the life cycle. The differentials increase slight-
ly by educational level: at the peak of the life cycle, 
the primary educated;.earn only.'1.1 times the earnings of the 
uneducated; while the: secondary, educated earn 1.5 times the 
earnings of the primary educated, and the college educated 
earn 1.8 times the earnings of the secondary educated. These 
ratios are low, though, in very rough comparison with those • 
in other countries, i-,% 
The social returns to completed education vary between 
8 and 10 percent. Although low, if allowance is made for 
productivity growth, then the latter returns are compatible 
with the returns to physical capital investment. The private 
returns to completed education vary between 11 and 27 percent, 
and, generally, rise by educational level. For the lower edu-
cational levels, both social and private returns are low in 
comparison .with those in other countries. Finally,, the excess 
of private returns over social teturns is attributable to 
government educational expenditure., and the rise in the excess 
by educational level indicates that higher education is 
more heavily subsidised than lower education.. 
For the patient reader who desires the qualifications 
to these results, the organisation of the paper is as follows,. 
The next section broadly identifies the theoretical framework 
of the study® The subsequent section describes the various 
data utilized in the analysis, and specifically identifies the 
theoretical framework with a selection of Vc^riables and forms 
appropriate for the data, • The fourth section estimates the 
earnings functions; derives the gross income differentials by 
age categories, or age-income profiles; and calculates the-' 
marginal rates of return. The paper concludes with a summary 
of the results and a discussion of the policy implications. 
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-V' II o Theoretical Framework 
'The human capital conceptualization of education is as 
an investment activity which yields a return over the lifetime 
of the educated individual 1 There are several project 
analysis techniques to calculate this return and one of these 
is the internal rate of return: it is the discount rate which
; 
reduces to zero the present value of the lifetime income dif • 
1 
ferentials attributable to education net of educational costs. 
As education is attained in stages, a separate rate, defined at 
the margin, is calculable for each educational level. 
1 
Note that there exists a debate on the correct, choice of 
technique and that while the.selection of the internal rate of 
return is most popular it is nonetheless arbitrary. See: /13» 
The marginal rate, r, is calculable by determining the follow-
ing algebraic expression: 
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where Y is net income and (Y - Y .), is the net income dif-
e e-1 t 
ferential attributable to the marginal educational level, e, 
for each year, t, of the individual's lifetime. Clearly, the 
magnitude of the rate varies directly with the magnitude and 
timing of the net income differentials: the greater the dif-
ferentials and the earlier these are realized, the higher is 
the rate of return. 
The calculation of the net income- differentials involves 
two major steps and numerous minor ones chap'^/' • fi
rs
"t 
major step is the estimation of the gross income differentials 
over the lifetime of the educated individual. The second major 
step is-the derivation of the net income differentials through 
the deduction of educational - costs. T^e numerous minor steps 
consist of corrections to either income or costs for such fac«* 
tors as: differences in private and social perspective; nonedu-
cational determinants of income; and the probabilities of employ-
ment and life expectancy. The two major steps are now outlined 
in turn, while the numerous minor* steps are noted wherever aipropriat 
The estimation by educational level of the lifetime 
gross income differentials requires a separate estimation of 
an earnings function—a regression of income on a g e — f o r each 
2 
educational level. The lifetime gross incomes to each educational 
level is then simply the difference in the estimated lifetime incomes 
for that level and its preceding one. The lifetime gross incomes to 
each educational level are the social gains in increased productivity 
due to education (provided wages reflect the marginal product of 
i. . .!'•*•>!! . -
labour), while the lifetime gross incomes calculated exclusive of 
income t a x — b y a regression of disposable income on a g e — a r e the 
•5 
private gains realized' by the individual. As individual lifetime 
.longitudinal data is unavailable, the earnings function is fitted nn 
cross-seotion data for employed individuals of varying ages at a given 
educational level. The presumption is that a cross-sectional age-
income profile of an individual's prospective educational peers 
determines the individual's ex ante expectations of the returns to f :
different educational levels,, 
2 "' ' 
Alternatively, an earnings function can be estimated for the 
pooled data of all educational levels. In this form, the earnings 
function is a regression of income on schooling and work experience; 
see: _/• This form is not considered necessary in the paper except 
for the post-graduate educational level for which very few observa-
tions necessitate a pooling with the college educational level. 
3 
If wages do not reflect the marginal product of labour^ then 
corrections to gross incomes are necessary; see: /_ 13, p«> 26__/„ 
Although there is a need for such corrections—the shadow wage__of_ 
unskilled labour is estimated at one-half of the market wage / 8 _ / — 
no corrections are made in view of the absence of a similar estimate 
for skilled labour, and of the lack of accurate Information on the 
association of skill with educational level» 
k 
However, possible future shifts in the labour-market are not 
sonsidered, so that the calculated rates of return are not ideally 
ex 'ante; see: / 13, pp„ 2 I t is possible to allow for simple 
productivity growth by the addition of the expected annual growth 
rate to the calculated rates" of return; see: /_ pp„ 31 _/» 
Although there is reason_ to believe, that expected productivity growth 
is positive / -7_/, addition is not made in view of the 
present absence of an accurate estimate. 
For each educational level, a concave earnings function 
is estimated by a least squares regression of income on age, 
and on selected standardization variables, Notationally, the 
form of the regression is: 
ln(Y) = a +bA - cA
2
 + / d. Z, + u 
. i i 
x 
where ln(Y) is the natural logrithm of income, A is age, and 
Z^ are standardization variables; of course, u is the well-
behaved regression error, and the regression coefficients are 
a, b, c, and The inclusion of the standardization variables 
to correct for income differences between educational 
levels due to noneducatiohal factors /t3,pp. 28-^7. . For instance, 
if the proportion of self-employed individuals declines 
by educational level, and if a part of self-employment income 
is likely to be a return to physical capital investment and hot 
education, then nonstandardlzation overestimates the age regres-
sion coefficients of the lower educational levels to*a greater 
extent than those of the higher educational levels and, therefore, 
• i . 
underestimates the income differentials attributable to*education, 
The standardization is attained by first allowing for such noneduca-
tional factors, in each educational level regression, and 
second by holding the Z^ constant in deriving each educational 
level's age-income profile. 
The derivation of the age-income profiles from the estimated 
earnings functions is straightforward. The profiles are simply 
plots of the standardized regressions in an age-income Carte-
sian plane; as such, each depicts the lifetime expected incomes 
for a particular educational level. Theory suggests that each 
profile follows the life cycle: it rises initially with age 
through the accumulation of job experience, peaks at middle age, 
5 
and then gradually declines with increased age. Theory also 
suggests that the profiles for higher educational levels rise 
above those for lower educational levels—once the inexperience 
handicap resulting from a delayed entry into the job market is 
overcome—so that income differentials emerge and maintain over 
the life cycle. Clearly, whether these differentials yield high 
rates of return depends on educational costs. 
Educational costs are of two types: monetary and oppor-
tunity. .Monetary costs comprise all direct and indirect expen-
ditures on education. The- former include he cost of'tuition, 
books, supplies, and teacher salaries (not paid through tuition 
revenue); the latter include the capital cost of classroom 
buildings and other school property (also not paid through 
tuition revenue). Opportunity costs comprise all earnings 
forgone during school attendance-. Although nonmonetary, forgone 
earnings for the relevant time period derive readily from the 
age-income.profile of the Y^ ^ educational level, which repre-
sents the highest income alternative to school attendance. 
5 
The decline is more rapid for profiles derived from cross-
section data due to the 'vintage effect': individuals are not 
homogeneous in the quality of their _ed.ucation as new technology 
is embodied in younger individuals p.l'g/c 
The distinction between private and social cost is sim-
ple. Private cost is that incurred by the individual,. This 
consists of the individual's monetary expenditures on tuition 
(less any financial assistance provided to the individual), 
books, supplies, and the opportunity cost of forgone earnings, 
all expressed annually for each year of school attendance. 
Social cost is that incurred by society. This consists of the 
private cost, and all remaining expenditures not incurred by 
the individual such as the cost of teacher salaries and school 
property (not..paid through tuition revenue), also expressed 
annually .per pupil. 
The deduction of annual private (social) costs from the 
estimated annual private (social) gross income differentials 
yields, for each educational level, the lifetime private 
(social) net income differentials. As the net incomes derive 
.from earnings functions estimated for employed individuals 
(who by ..definition are alive), corrections for the probabili-
ties of employment, w, and life expectancy, s, are necessary 
as these effects are not reflected in the estimations.^ 
A correction is sometimes;made for the probability of 
labour force participation on the assumption that the labour force 
entry decision is, like the employment and life expectancy decisions, 
also determined exogenously and not by the individual. This 
assumption is not made in the paper and no labour force participation 
correction is considered. 
The corrections imply a downward adjustment to the lifetime 
net income differentials. Kotationally, the adjusted differ-
entials for each educational level, e, are: 
where both w and s are positive but less than unity, and 
are indexed by t as these v e r y over the life cycle. The 
discount rate which reduces to zero the present value of 
these adjusted differentials is the rate of return to the 
marginal educational level, e. 
. Finally, the probability rates and s, are de-
fined as follows. The employment rate, w^, is the proportion 
of employed individuals in the labour force of age t. And 
the life expectancy rate, is the proportion of individual 
alive at the initial school-going age (of the particular educ-
ational level) who survive to the year t . Ideally, these 
rates should be calculated separately for each educational 
level. This disaggregation is specially appropriate for 
as the probability of employment is likely to vary fend 
not necessarily positively) with educational attainment. 
Two principal types of data are used in the paper. The 
socio-economic data is from a 1,000 household survey of Rawal-
pindi City. The educational cost data is from national estimates 
by the government of Pakistan. Both data are for 1975* The survey 
data is discussed first. 
t 
III. Data 
A . Socio-Economic Data 
To begin with, some brief characteristics of Rawalpindi 
City are useful. The most important of these is that Rawalpindi 
is the fifth largest Pakistani city with an estimated population 
of 673,000 individuals in 1975°^ ^he city is an important 
regional metropolis, with primarily administrative functions. 
In the early sixties, it was the Nation's interim capital. 
Even today, several of the earlier capital functions remain. 
With the development of Islamabad, the new capital., on its 
outskirts, Rawalpindi's wholesale trade and construction 
activities expanded, and have emerged as important.. However, 
manufacturing activity is largely nonexistant in the city. 
In August and September of 1975, the Pakistan Institute 
of Development Economics undertook a socio-economic survey of 
o 
1,000 Rawalpindi households. A. tight budget necessitated the 
small sample size "and a simple sampling design. The latter 
involved, first, a random selection without replacement of 16 
clusters—a clust or consi sts of approximately 225 households— 
n 
'The estimation is a projection of the 1972 census estimate 
at a 3°2 percent annual growth rate. 
The unidentified Institute members involved in the under-
taking 
v/ere ; Iqbal Alarn, Stephen E . Guisinger, Sarfraz K
0 
Qureshi, and Abdul Wasay. 
- : 1 1 : -
from a A-OO^eluster sampling frame devel&ped for Rawalpindi City 
by the Central Statistical Division. And second, a selection 
of a fixed proportion of households per cluster, 
x (= 1,000 / 16),from the Division's cluster-wise address 
listing of all structured and semi-structured dwellings. The 
• \ 
household selection criterion was to sample every ^th (= the 
total number of dwellings / x) address, given a randomly chosen 
initial address.9, 
Basic socio-economic information was collected for each 
of the 1,000 selected households. For this purpose, a 57-item 
questionnaire was developed, twice pre-tested, and revised. 
The revised questionnaire was completed for each household by 
one of six direct-hire professional enumerators through an 
interview with the head of household or, if unavailable, the 
senior-most household member. Interviews were conducted on 
Sundays and weekday ;evenings to minimize the probability of 
unattended dwellings. All completed questionnaires were field 
checked by a supervisor at- the close of each enumeration day 
for omissions and ambiguous answers; if necessary, the enumerators 
were instructed to re-conduct unsatisfactory interviews. 
^Phe i-^+1 dwelling.address was sampled whenever the 
i — dwelling was: (1) unattended during tv/o re-visits, 
(2) vacant, (3) an establishment, (k) an institution, or 
(5) government-owned. 
Two types of sampling error can arise for the,above 
sample size and design. First, small samples generally 
yield few observations for minority groups, so generalizations 
I-
derived from the data for these groups could be erroneous. As 
expected, the sample yielded 1,5^1 males and only 123 females 
"in the labour force. Even the male subsample, when disaggregated 
by educational level, yields few observations for the higher . i . ' • 
. . e • • 
educational level®: only 10 males have university education. 
To avoid possible errors associated with inadequate sample size, 
the paper analyses only the male Subsample and, moreover, 
focuses attention on only the lower educational levels. 
Second, small, simply selected samples are generally 
unrepresentative of the larger population, so any generalization 
derived from the data could be erroneous. One technique which 
reduces the possibility of this type of sampling error is 
stratification. Although the sampling design does not allow 
for stratification, a post-selection examination indicates 
that the selected clusters are geographically well-stratified. 
Within clusters, however, the sampling of only structured and 
Semi-structured dwellings introduces the possibility of skewed 
income, educational, and migrant ...status distributions; a-
reasonable presumption is that this design excludes a greater 
proportion of the poor, the illiterate, and the. recent migrant, 
so that the effect—if a n y — o f the sampling error is to 
underestimate the return to primary education. With respect to 
other variables (such as age, sex, and occupation), a post-
selection examination of the distributions of the sampled 
labour force members with the corresponding distributions 
identified by the earlier and larger—311,7^9 persons—1960 
socio-economic survey of Rawalpindi TO _/, indicates that 
the two samples are similarly distributed and, to the extent 
that the earlier survey is representative, the present survey 
is representative. 
Several checks were undertaken to gauge the extent of 
nonsampling error in the survey; there are two types: response 
and nonresponse. With regard to response errors, the 
likelihood of unintentional recall errors is relatively low as 
all-questions pertain to basic, easily recallable information: 
age, seJt, employment status, and the like; however, the 
self-employed appear to have greater difficulty in interpreting 
their hours worked than do employees: the former typically 
work from sunrise to sunset even though they always manage to 
have meals and an afternoon rest in between! A more serious 
type of response error is the likelihood of the intentional 
underreporting of income. To control for this problem, 
expenditure and type-of-housing questions were asked to 
determine a lower bound to household income; in addition, 
the enumerators were asked to note their opinion in each 
completed questionnaire on the probability of underreporting. 
A careful analysis of these controls suggests some potential 
instances of income underreporting; but none of these were 
particularly unbelieveable. to justify elimination. 
Finally, there is the possibility of nonresponse 
errors,.. '-These errors are usually traceable to improperly . 
completed questionnaires and careless data transcription. 
The twin procedures adopted to check for these errors are 
field checks by Institute staff and data editing. Aside from -. 
the already noted field checks, approximately 20 percent of 
the sample households were visited by Institute staff and no 
instances of enumerator-counterfeited questionnaires for 
nonexistant households were noted. The data was manually edited xfexfee 
at the coding and card punching stages, and computer-edited 
through multiple consistency checks at the print-out stage: 
minor errors were spotted and corrected. 
The summary statistics for the data.of interest are 
as follqws. There are 1 • 66b individuals in the labour force, 
of whom 1,5^1 are males. Half the males in the labour force, 
percent, are employees, while 33»7percent are self-employed; 
almost all of the.former 97°7 percent, are salaried, and.almost 
all of the latter, 88.5 percent, are individual operators. 
Surprisingly, only 5»3 percent o f the males in the labour force 
are unemployed; underemployment, though, is substantial: 23.8 
percent of the males- would like to work more hours. The minority 
member of the male labour force are apprentices, 3-2 percent
f
 and. 
unpaid family helpers, 7«5 'percent. 
-:15s-
The subsample of all employed and self-employed males 
is chosen for analysis. Apprentices are excluded for. a 
theoretical reason: although in the labour force, they are 
also investing in human capital through on-the-job training 
so their earnings are lower (by the amount of the trainee 
cost) than the earnings of nonapprentices, and the two earnings 
are not comparable, therefore /_ T , p. 157° It is possible to 
include the unemployed and so directly correct the income 
differentials for the probability of employment / 13 , p.29/, 
this is not done, however, as the unemployment rate ".yielded 
by the sample, 5-3 percent, appears to be low; instead, the 
indirect employment correction indicated in the previous 
• section is lised. Ideally, unpaid family helpers should be 
-included; they are excluded, though, because their income is 
not easily determinable. Still, it is possible to allow for 
their presence indirectly: a standardization variable indicat-
ing the number of unpaid family helpers associated with each 
self-employed individual—the variable is necessarily zero 
for employees-—is defined for the earnings functions. 
Analysis of the self-employed is troublesome because a 
portion of self-employment income tends to be a return to 
physical capital investment. A reasonable assumption is that 
the return is low for individual operators (who presumably 
own little capital stock) and high for those self-employed 
with employees. If correct, then the problem is serious for 
only a fraction, 4.6 percent, of the selected subsample. 
Again, an appropriate allowance for the problem is possible. 
A standardization variable, this thime a dummy (= 1 if an 
individual is self-employed with employees, and 0 otherwise), 
is defined for the earnings functions. 
The distribution of the selected subsample of 1,295 
10 
individuals by educational level is.as follows. k39 are 
unschooled of whom 50 are functional literates; 119 have less 
than primary schooling. 285 have completed primary school and 
possibly some secondary schooling; 375 have completed secondary 
school through matriculation and possibly some college schooling. 
67 have completed college and received a B.A. degree; and 10 have 
attended university and received a post-graduate diploma. This 
arbitrary, discontinuous grouping is unfortunate; yet, it is the 
response grouping of the educational question used in the survey. 
10 
Education in Pakistan consists of : 5 years of primary 
school; 3 years of middle school-'and 2 years of high school, 
both of which together comprise secondary school and completion 
of which is termed matriculation; 2 years of intermediate college 
and 2 years of degree college, both of which together comprise 
college and the completion of which is'.marked with the award of a 
B.A. degree'; and 2 years of university, the completion of which 
is marked with the award of a post-graduate diploma. As a 
simplification, medicine, engineering, and similar specialized 
education is not considered. 
-:17s-
With one ..exception, the above distribution yields 
sufficient observations per ~educational level group to allow 
the estimation of a separate earnings function for each. The 
exception is the university educational level which, for the 
estimation purpose, is combined with the college educational 
level to form a post-secondary group of 77 observations. 
For the latter group, a dummy variable ( = 1 for university 
graduates and 0 otherwise) is defined to distinguish 
betv/een the age-income profiles of the college and university 
educational levels. This technique assumes that the two 
profiles are similarly shaped and differ only in th6" intercept. 
Although perhaps ap. acceptable assumption, any interpretation 
of the dummy variable coefficient must be cautious as its 
estimation depends on only 10 observations. 
Income, the dependent variable in the earnings functions, 
is defined as hourly earnings. Specifically, it is the ratio 
of monthly income to monthly hours worked, where monthly income 
is wage Income (including bonus payments) and income in kind for 
both primary and secondary occupations, and monthly hours worked 
are the* hours worked in the survey reference week multiplied 
by 'The choice of hourly earnings is based on observed 
variations in the sample in the average hours worked per week 
between individuals of different educational levels-: - the 
educated tend to work fewer hours than the uneducated. As. 
already noted', these variations in part may be due to nonsampling 
error (since the uneducated are proportionately more self-employed); 
however, in part these also reflect an individual's time allocation 
decision between work and leisure. In the latter and potentially 
more important case, -hourly earnings standardize for this 
substitution effect and are, therefore, a more appropriate measure 
11 of income. 
It is desirable to conclude this discussion of the survey 
data with a review of the calculations to be performed in the next 
section. For each of five educational level groups (unschooled, 
incomplete primary, primary (-plus), secondary (*-plus) and post-
secondary), consisting of employed and self-employed individuals, 
an earnings ^function is estimated by a regression of the natural 
logarithm of hourly earnings on age and two standardization 
variables. ' Also, the earnihgs function estimation for the post-
secondary educational level group includes a dummy variable 
identifying university graduates in order to derive an age-income 
profile for these individuals, and the estimation for the unschooled 
12 
group includes a dummy variable for functional literates. 
The two standardization variables attempt to control for the effects 
of unpaid family helpers and nohearnings income. The standardization 
is attained in two ways:, first, within each educational level's 
Even in the
:
 former case, standardization may be appro-
priate as nonwork time incurred in underemployment is not strictly 
leisure. 
12 
Mo age-income profile is derived for functional literates, 
though« 
- s t r -
e a m i n g s function, by an evaluation of the function with these 
variables set to zero (since all calculations.are for individuals 
with no unpaid family helpers and no nonearnings income); and 
second, between educational levels, by maintaining these variables 
constant at zero in the ;derivatitfh of each educational level'fi 
age-income profile. 
Bo 'Cost Data 
The initial step in the specification of costs is to 
determine the number of years of schooling associated with each 
educational level. The determination is simple for the 
unschooled, college, and university levels: at 0, and 2 years 
of marginal schooling, respectively; however, the .determination 
is approximate for the three open-ended educational level groups: 
incomplete primary, primary(-plus), and secondary(-plus)o The 
years of schooling for the incomplete primary group is 
determined at 2 (which is the average number of years of 
incomplete primary schooling = (5-1) / 2)„ The average years of 
schooling of the primary(-plus) group and the marginal years of 
schooling of the secondary(-plus) group are determined at 5 eacho 
On the simple assumption that the proportion who complete further 
years is small so that ±he distributionof individuals is skewed 
towards 5 years of (average or marginal) schooling; if the latter 
assumption is incorrect, then its effect—if a n y — i s "to ovei--
13 
estimate the return to primary and secondary education,, 
13 
Given the assumption, the (-plus) qualification is deleted 
from the primary and secondary educational level groups« 
. - 2 0 : -
Note that the above determination does^not consider—due to 
lack of data—the likelihood of individuals repeating one or 
more years of schooling. 
The next step is to determine the annual cost of 
schooling. As already noted, the cost consists of all monetary 
expenditures on schooling and all earnings foregone during school 
attendance. The latter derive readily rom the age-income 
profile of the Y^ educational level. The former ordinarily 
derive from expenditure data, but unfortunately none exists; 
instead, these, derive from national.estimates by the Planning 
Commiss? 'W £ 12 ^J
y
 and the Bureau of Educational Planning 
/ 11 _ / . The expenditure estimates- are detailed in Appendix 
Table 1; although perhaps slightly low, no attempt to second-
guess is made. 
The average annual cost of schooling by educational level 
is summarized in Table-1. -Two rough comparisbns of these figures 
with those for other countries is possible. First, as in most 
countries, opportunity cost (= private cost - direct cost) is 
the principal component of social cost for primary and secondary 
education; however, the proportion, 70 percent, is high relative 
to that observed in developing countries, 53 percent, or even 
that observed in developed countries, 67 percent, /13, pp."26-7/, 
Second, ignoring opportunity cost and all indirect costs, the 
direct cost of a year of secondary (college) education is twice 
(nine times) the cost of a year of primary education; these 
-:21:-
Table 1 
Average Annual Rupee Educational Cost Per. Student % Level 
!i Government Cost • Private Cost 
Educational 5 Years of 8 Social 5 Total : Direct (%) 0 Total : Direct (% 
Level ^Schooling 5 Cost 
School 
Primary 
Middle 
High 
College 
f 
Intermediate 
Degree 
University _ 
885 2^6
 5 9 
2,123 507 59 
2,524 710 56 
2 . 4,742 1,931 52 
2 5,574 2,441 49 
2 '21 ,985 17,414 29 
639 
1,616 
1,814 
2,811 
3,133 
4,571 
5 
2 
3 
16 
15 
17 
Source: Appendix Table 1 and age-income profiles (for opportunity cost), 
Note : annual opportunity aost is calculated for a ten-month schooling 
cycle. 
—: 2 2: _ 
cost rations are identical to those observed in developed 
countries but much less than those in developing countries, 
7: -1 (and 77: 1).„ In view of these disparities it is important 
to emphasize that... the. expenditure cost; data, for Pakistan 
derives from estimates. 
IV. Analysis 
A . Earnings Functions 
For each educational level, an earnings function is 
estimated as specified in the previous section; the estimations 
are summarized in Table 2. By standard criteria, the estimations 
are good. All equations are significant at the 1 percent level, 
by the F-test. The human capital variables in all. quations 
possess expected signs and are also significant at the 1 percent 
:
Tevel, by the t-test. And, the goodness-of-fit'of all 
regressions—the R varies between 20 percent and percent—is 
respectable for household data if it is recalled that the 
samples are stratified by education (itself a principal determinant 
\ *> of income) and the dependent variable is hourly earnings instead 
of monthly earnings. 

The importance of the standardization and dummy 
variables varies. The helpers variable, a standardization 
for unpaid' family.helpers, and the employer variable,'a 
standardization ;for nonearriings income, are important only 
for the lower educational levels. This is traceable to 
occupational differences between educational levels: the 
more educated tend to enter, employee occupations rather than 
self-employment occupations. The literate variable, a dummy 
Identifying the literate among the unschooled group, is 
insignificant suggesting no wage premium for functional 
literacy. However, the university variable, a dummy 
identifying university graduates among the post-secondary group 
is positive g^nd^significant.^at- the 5.'percent level, by the 
t-test. 
A cursory look at the variance of the dependent variable 
provides a rough indication of the differences in income 
inequality between educational levels. The. variance of ln( Y) 
is a popular measure of income inequality ^2,p.7/. By this 
measure, income inequality is greatest among the unschooled. 
, * 
It is least among-the primary
;
schooled. Generally, the degree 
of income inequality declines by educational level, if allowance yj 
is made for the heterogeneous nature of the post-secondary 
educational level. 
•» -
A similar look at the mean of the ^pendent variable 
provides an indication of the differences in income between 
educational levels. The mean of ln(Y) is the logarithm of 
the geometric mean of Y, and is therefore a popular central 
tendency measure of income ^2, p.7/. By this measure, hourly 
earnings rise by educational level. The marginal rises for 
the secondary and post-secondary educational levels are 
significant at the 1 percent level, by t-tests of the difference 
between means modified for unequal variances. However, the 
rises for the lower educational levels are insignificant. 
B* Age-Income Profiles 
The differences in income between educational levels 
are more appropriately viewed over the life cycle. Figure 1 
presents age-income profiles, derived from the earnings functions 
•ik 
in Table 2, for all educational levels. As expected, the 
,-, The college (university) profile is derived from the post-secondary 
earnings, function with the university variable set at 0 (1), For all 
profiles, the derivation procedure is as -follows. -First, the standardization 
and literacy variables are set at 0. Second, estimated hourly earnings are 
calculated for all regressions for an assumed 65-year life cycle. The 
initial years vary depending on the age of job entryv The latter is set 
at 7 years — t h e age of the youngest worker in the sample—for the 
unschooled group and at 5 plus the number of years of ..schooling—the 
age immediately following the age of school completion—for the remaining 
groups; -Third., the estimated hourly earnings are converted to annual 
earnings; to do so, 2,30*t (= k8 * 12) hours of v/ork in a year are 
assumed. Finally, the annual earnings are plotted in ten-year age 
intervals in an age-income Cartesian plane, 'and the plots are connected 
with linear line segments. Note that the profiles appear to peak at the 
same age since the actual peaks lie in the same age interval. In 
fact, the average peak age is years, and the peak age range is 
^5 to 53 years. 

-:27: -
profiles are concave and follow the life cycle: these rise 
initially with age through the accumulation of job experience, 
peak on the average at age ^9) and then decline with increased age. 
With ohe exception, the concavity o f the profiles increases 
by educational level. Also with one exception, the profiles 
for higher educational levels are above those for lower educatinal 
levels so that income differentials emergd with the initial 
year of work and maintain over
h
 the life cycle. 
' i /. 
t - • • -•:. '" 
The latter exception is the profile of the incomplete 
primary educational level. Although below the unschooled profile 
initially, it rises above the unschooled profile (at about 
age 20), the primary profile ( at about age bo) , and the secondary 
profile ( at about age 60) . The initial negative income 
differential is intuitively a puzzle: presumably, individuals 
do not compl te school due to high opportunity costs, yet, the 
earnings of those who-do leave school are lower than the 
earnings'of'those who do not attend school. One explanation 
is on-the-job training /" 1, p . 1^7: the initial negative 
differential could represent an implicit- training investment cost, 
and the subsequent, increasingly positive income differential 
: * 
would then represent a joint return to the training and the 
partial schooling. An alternate explanation is the 'screening 
hypothesis' 9, p° 986/: in the absence of a certification 
of incomplete schooling, school leavers are initially underpaid 
their marginal product. 
Returning to the differences in income between educational 
levels, these increase by educational level, but slightly. The 
ratios of gross annual income differentials at age 49 for primary/ 
unschooled, secondary/primary, and college/secondary are 1.12, 
1.47, and 1.84, respectively. The college educated earn three 
times the earnings of the uneducated. These ratios are low in 
very rough comparison to those for other developing countries 
(where the average secondary/primary ratio is 2.39)» and are in 
line with those in developed countries (where the average 
secondary/primary ratio is 
1 o 4 3 V
p
 The low magnitude of the 
ratios is partly explained by the urban setting of the earners 
sample, though» 
C . Rates of Return 
The analysis now turns to the net differences in income 
between ducational levels. As indicated in the second section, 
the project analysis technique selected to iclate income benefits 
with costs is. the internal i-ate of return. Table 3 presents the 
private and social internal rates of return to all (marginal) 
educational levels. ,The calculation of the social rates is 
based on the before-tax, age-income profiles in Figure 1 and 
15 
The comparison is very rqugh as the ratios and educational^ 
levels for other countries-are computed differently; see /13
?
 p . 1 3 ^ « 
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Table 3 
Marginal Rates of Return to Education by Level 
Educational 
level 
Years of $ Returns (in percentage) 
Schooling jl Pri vat e : Social 
Incomplete Primary 
Primary 10 
Secondary 5 11 9 
College k 14 10 
University 2 27 8 
Note: The returns to the primary• level are marginal with 
respect to the unschooled level and not the 
uncomplete primary level, and are therefore 
average returns. 
All rates are corrected for the probability of life 
expectancy. 
on the social cost estimations in Table 1; while the calculation 
of the private rates is based on after-tax, age-income profiles 
(not presented) and On the private cost estimations in Table 1. 
All rates are corrected for the probability of life expectancy. 
For all educational levels, private returns exceed 
social returns. Ignoring the extreme levels, the excess is 
2-h percentage points. Between educational levels, the 
variation in private returns exceeds the variation in social 
returns. Private returns vary between 7 and 27 percent, and, 
generally, rise by educational level. Social returns vary 
between 5 and 10 percent, only. 
In comparison with other co\mtries, the returns to 
17 
primary and secondary education are low. For primary 
education, private and social return's are about 10 percentage 
points below the averages of comparable returns in other 
countries, and are outside the standard deviations of the 
averages. For secondary education, private and social 
returns are about 5 percentage points below the averages of. 
comparable returns in other countries, but are inside the 
standard deviations of the averages. Between all edueational 
levels, thejates do not exhibit the pattern observed in 
other countries of declining returns by educational level. 
:probability of life expectancy, s , for-each year t of 
the life cycle is calculated as the multiplicative product of the 
survival rates for all years between the initial school-going age 
(of a particular educational level) and__the age t. The survival 
rfates are from.,: / 3, Appendix Table IB/. 
17 ' 
All comparisons with other countries are based on 
figures in: / 13, chap. 47» 
However, the 2-k percentage point excess of private returns 
over social returns is comparable with a 3-6 percentage 
point excess observed in other countries. 
The absence of reliable employment rate estimates 
prevent the calculation of returns corrected for the 
probability of employment. However, a common presumption is 
that unemployment is serious primarily for individuals with 
secondary and post-rsecondary education and, also primarily 
for their initial years in the job market due to the 
inexperience handicap resulting from their delayed entry. 
If true, then a check on the sensitivity of returns to the 
probability of employment is possible with the use of arbitrary 
but reasonable correction rates. If it is assumed that the 
probabilities of employment in the first five years of 
entry in the job market for individuals with secondary and 
post-secondary education are, respectively: .50, .75; >85, 
.90, and .95, then the corrected social returns to secondary, 
college, and university education are 9 percent, 9 percent, 
and 7 percent, respectively. And, the corrected private 
returns are 11 percent, 13 percent, and 26 percent, respectively. 
18 
By this 
presumption, the age-income profiles for higher 
educational levels in Figure 1 might initially lie below those 
for lower educational levfels if the profiles were "Corrected 
for the probability of employment. 
. -
:
 3?: - ., 
Evidently, returns are relatively insensitive. 
The employment correction lowers the returns by not more 
than a percentage point„ This result is similar to that 
observed in other countries, p.23/° On the matter of 
sensitivity, rates of return were also calculated without 
the life expectancy correction, and for nonstandardized • 
earnings functions. These rates do not differ from those• 
presented in Table 3, except for the incomplete primary 
leveland, then too, the.differential is only 2 percentage 
points. 
• V. Conclusion 
The results of the paper' are summarized as follows. 
For all completed educational levels-, income differentials 
emerge with the initial year of work and maintain over the 
..life cycle. . The differentials 'increase slightly by educational 
level: at the peak of the life cycle, the primary educated 
earn only 1.1 times the. earnings of the uneducated; while-the. .. 
secondary educated earn 1.5 times the.earnings of the primary 
educated, and the college educated, earn 1«8 times the earnings 
of the secondary educated. These ratios are low, though, in 
very rough comparison with those in other countries. 
Differentials are not observable for functional literates, and 
the differentials observable for the incomplete primary 
educated are apparently influenced over the life cycle by 
either on-the-job training or the so-called 'certificate effect'. 
The.social returns to education vary between 5 
and 10 percent; however, the returns to completed education 
vary only slightly, between 8 and 10 percent. The private 
returns to education vary between 7 and 27 percent, and, 
generally, rise by educational level. The private return to 
primary education is percent, while the private-return to 
university education is 27 percent. For the lower educational 
levels, both social aid private returns are low in comparison 
with those in other countries. Finally, there is incidental 
indication that the degree of income inequality declines by 
educational level. 
The above results are subject to five specific-and four 
broad qualifications. The specifics: first, the rates reflect 
returns to male education in an urban enviornment—Rawalpindi 
City; at best, therefore, the returns are representative for 
males in other urban areas, in no case are these representative 
for females or, rural afeas-. Second, even for Rawalpindi the 
sample is small, so all -inferences from the results—especially 
those for the sparsely represented higher educat'ional levels— 
should be guarded. Third, the cost data is derived from estimates. 
Fourth, the returns are uncorrected for unemployment, but these
i; 
appear to be insensitive to such a correction; and fiftn, the 
returns do not allow for productivity growth over time—if the 
annual rate of growth is known, though, it should be added to 
the returns. 
Now the broader qualifications: first, the returns assume 
that market wages reflect the marginal product of labour; if 
incorrect, then the sensitivity of the returns to different 
reflection patterns should-be-explored. Second, while the 
earnings functions standardize for nonearnings income, unpaid 
family helpers^ and weekly hours worked, the functions do not 
standardize-—due to lack of data—for family background and 
ability. For the latter, a popular alternative to standard* 
ization is an. arbitrary downward correction to age-income profiles 
13, Po 2 8 n o such correction is attempted. Third, also due 
to lack of data, no allowance for the wastage cost of school 
repeaters or dropouts is possible. Finally, the net consumption 
benefits of education are ignored in the calculations, so such 
benefits should be regarded as additional to the calculated 
returns.. . . 
Given these qualifications, the policy implications of the 
results can be 
cXSSGSSG 
do The first concerns the investment 
choice between human capital and physical capital. Generally, 
the social returns to education are low. However, for the 
investment allocation decision it is specially important to allow 
for labour productivity growth: if allowance is made, for 
instance, for a 2 percent annual growth in productivity, then the 
social returns to completed education rise to 10-12 percent, 
and these are comparable with a 12 percent return to physical 
capital investment. With an allowance for productivity growth, 
therefore, investment in education is as profitable as invest-19 ment.in physical capital,, 
19 
The reader can modify this statement to suit different 
figures if the above are unreasonable. 
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The second policy implication concerns the investment 
choice between educational levels. Contrary to expectations, 
the social return to primary education is not higher than the 
social returns to other educational levels. It is neither 
lower, however, In fact, the differential in social returns 
is too narrow to recommend resource allocation towards any 
particular educational level. Rather—unless the consumption 
benefits, of education are strongly skewed—the recommendation 
is for investment at all levels of education. 
The third policy implication concerns the difference 
between social \ind private returns to education. Private : 
returns exceed social returns
r
 and the excess rises by 
educational level from 2- percentage points to 19 percentage 
points. As the excess is attributable to government educational 
expenditure (and only negligibly to the income tax adjustment), 
the rise in the excesg^by educational level indicates that'" 
higher education is more heavily subsidized than lower education. 
:•' • t 
Evidently, this distribution reflects government policy.
2
® In 
any case, the present policy of free primary and secondary 
education provides only a small subsidy—a 2-k percentage point 
excess differential in returns—relative to the existing college 
20 
Such a policy is stated by the Federal Minister for 
Education, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, in a speech delivered at the 
Installation and Oath Taking Ceremony of the Students Union of 
the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, on October 26, 1976. 
and university education subsidy—a 4-19 percentage point exc ess 
differential in returns. 
The fourth po.lipy implication concerns the v/ide variation— 
of 20 percentage points—in the private returns to education. 
The variation is largely at the extreme educational, levels: 
the return to incomplete primary education is one-half of the 
returns to primary, secondary, and college educationj while the 
return to university.-education is almost double the returns 
to primary, secondary, and college education. Such wide 
variations indicate a highly imperfect market: the low return 
to incomplete primary education suggests an excess supply of 
individuals at that level and, or, the operation of a 'csrtifrcate 
effect'; while the high return to university education suggests 
a shortage of individuals at that level. Although such a market 
situation ranks private incentives in favour of further education, 
only individuals from relatively .high income families with acc ess 
to low-cost educational financing can realize the high returns on 
21 
further education. Even then, the demand for higher education 
could exert excessive market pressure on existing higher educational 
21 
The argument assumes imperfect access to educational financi 
If this.. argument is too intuitive, the reader is referred to formal 
models of the private demand__for education from which the argument 
derives; see / 13, pp. 77-79/ for a discussion and references. 
facilities—pressure which does not reflect social resource 
..' ,
 :
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allocation considerations. 
A narrowing of the pfivate returns is recommended, 
therefore. This is, possible with a shift in the finance of 
university direct costs' from the government to the private sector. 
A 1,000 rupee increase in the annual university student tuition 
lowers the private return to university, education 'from 2? percent 
to 23 percent or by only 4 percentage, points; a further 1,000 
rupee increase lowers the return by only an additional 3 
points; and an oven further 1,000 rupee increase lowers the 
•. r
 : 
return by only an additional 2' points. In fact, a complete shift 
in the finance of university direct costs to the private sector 
is possible without altering the ranking of private incentives 
in favour of university education: a 5,000 rupee increase in the 
annual university student tuition lowers the private return to 
university education to 15 percent—which is still the highest - • p 7 
return to any educational level. To ensure that a tuition 
22 
Although unsubstantiated in the paper, the assessment that 
the private demand for higher-education presently exceeds the 
capacity of existing facilities is reasonable. 23 
The cautions reader may prefer a lower tuition increase than 
5,000 rupees, however; not only because a large increase is 
impractical, but also because a safe margin of error should be 
attached to the university income differentials as these are based 
on few data observations. In defense of the estimations, though, 
a careful scrutiny of the university age-income profile in Figure 1 
shov/s it to be very realistic, if not low, in comparison to the 
National Pay Scale for government employees with a M.A. degree 
who typically commence' work at the Grade 16 level. 
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increase does not deprive individuals from low income families of a 
university education, appropriate low-cost educational finance 
schemes can be established through existing credit institutions. 
The fifth policy implication concerns the government policy 
to universalize primary education. The results of the paper are 
too limited in scope to substantiate the desirability of this 
poli cy «. Perhaps no analysis which ignores the consumption 
benefits pf literacy should even attempt to do so. However, if 
the policy is accepted as
A
 given, then it is useful to note that 
any shift in the finance of university direct costs from the 
government to the private sector releases funds which can be 
allocated to /ards primary education. A quick calculation • 
shows that a 1,000 rupee increase in the anntial university 
a' 
student tuition allows an approximate 1 percent increase in 
24 
national primary school er rollment „ .• 
The sixth policy implication concerns the opportunity 
cost of primary education. The survey data indicat.es. a 
relatively high opportunity cost to the final three years of 
primary education: for these years, opportunity cost comprises 
97 (78) percent of total private•(social) cost. Since the years 
cover ages 7-9,,the cost is frequently de-emphasized: the 
2k ~
 !
 ' 
The calculation: (1,000) (13,000) / (246) (5,093,430) = .01 
where 13,000 (5,093,420) is national university (Primary) 
enrollment for 1975 / 12, chap. 22/, and 246 is the annual per 
student rupee cost of primary education incurred by the 
government. 
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labour force entry age is typically assumed at 10, for 
instance; however, such de-emphasis is misleading. ^Opportunity 
cost. is. both apparent and real, and needs to be recognized 
if the private incentives in favour of primary education ^re 
to be improved. A corollary.to- this implication:is that 
a further reduction in direct cost will yield a negligible 
improvement in the private incentives in favour of primary 
education. 
The final policy implication is speculative and concerns • 
the potential benefit of primary curricular reform. A 
proposal presently cfebated is the institution of an intensive 
learning program designed to shorten the primary years of 
' ;•.
f4
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schooling to 4 years or, more ambitiously, to 3 years. 
, KC; .*' . '1" 
:If it is assumed that' feuch a program alters -the duration of 
education with no sacrifice in quality-,. then the effect of"' 
a four- (three-) year schooling program is to raise the 
private return to primary education by 6 (27) percentage 
points to -20 (41) percent, and to raise the social return by 4 ( 1 3 ) 
percentage points to 14 (23) p e r c e n t 
It is important to emphasize that these rises are. speculative 
as a static labour market is assumed. Still, these are sufficiently 
encouraging to recommend a careful analysis of the proposal. 
25 , 
^Such a program has been established in Nepal aid is under 
considdration in other countries. In Pakistan, a principal 
proponent is Khalid H . Bokhari of the Ministry of Education's 
Bureau of Educational Planning. 
26 
Note that the rises are attributable largely to a reduction 
in opportunity cost so if direct cost is to increase, which is 
likely, the rises would still be about the same magnitude. 
Bhatti/* 

References 
1. Becker, Gary S. Human Capital. New York : Columbia 
University Press. 1974. 
2. Chiswick, Barry R. Income Inequality. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 1974T 
3. Farooqui, Naseem Iqbal and Iqbal Alam. "Provisional 
Abridged Life Tables for Urban and Rural Areas in 
Pakistan, Based on PGS 1968 and 1971." Pakistan 
Development Review. Autumn 1974* 
4. Guisinger, Stephen E. and Mohammad Irfan. "Real 
Wages of Industrial Workers in Pakistan: 1954 to 
1970." Pakistan Development Review. Winter 1974. 
5* Hanoch, Giora. "An Economic Analysis of Earnings 
and Schooling." The Journal of Human Resources. 
Summer 1967. 
6. Hoerr, O.D. "Educational Returns and Educational 
Reform in Ethiopia." Eastern Africa Economic Review. 
December 1974. 
7. Kemal, A.R. "Sectoral Growth Rates and Efficiency 
of Factor Use: 1959/60 to 1969/70." Pakistan 
Development Review. (Forthcoming.) 
8. Khan, Shahrukh Rafi. "An Estimate of the Shadow 
Wage Rate in Pakistan." Pakistan Development Review. 
Winter 1974. 
9. Layard, Richaru and George Psacharopoulos. "The 
Screening Hypothesis and the Returns to Education." 
Journal of Political Economy. September/October 1974. 
10. Pakistan. Central Statistical Office. Spcio-^on^inic 
Survey Rawalpindi 1960. Karachi. I96O. 
11. . Ministry of Education. Bureau of Educational 
Planning. Pakistan Education 1974: A Sector Assessment. 
Islamabad. October 1974. 
12. __ . Planning Commission. Draft Fifth Five 
Year Plan 1976-81." Islamabad. January 1976. 
13» Psacharopoulos, George. Returns to Education. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers. 1973® 
Bhatti/* 
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
